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MIRANDA’S APPLICATION TO THE 
EXPANDING TERRY STOP 
Daniel C. Isaacs* 
INTRODUCTION 
In Miranda v. Arizona,1 the Supreme Court interpreted the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by holding 
that police may not interrogate a person taken into custody without 
first reading to the suspect their now-familiar Miranda rights.2 The 
question of what constitutes “police custody” is particularly vexing 
in the context of “Terry stops:” warrantless searches and seizures 
based upon reasonable suspicion, limited in scope, to determine 
whether a person is armed or in the midst of criminal activity.3 As 
the lawful scope of a Terry stop has expanded beyond its narrow 
and limited genesis in Terry v. Ohio,4 federal circuits have been 
unable to reach a consensus regarding whether a lawful Terry stop 
may constitute Miranda custody.5 The First and Fourth Circuits 
hold that a suspect is not in Miranda custody if the Terry stop was 
lawful, i.e. reasonable.6 Conversely, the Second, Seventh, Eighth, 
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits hold that the reasonableness of a Terry 
stop is irrelevant as to Miranda custody; if the circumstances of a 
                                                          
 * J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2010; B.A., Binghamton 
University, 2007. Special thanks to my parents and Laura for their 
encouragement, the entire staff of the Journal of Law and Policy for their 
endless editing assistance, and my friends for listening. 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
2 Id. at 444. 
3 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27–31 (1968). 
4 See infra Part I(B). 
5 E.g., United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 673 (2d Cir. 2004).  
6 E.g., United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1110 (4th Cir. 1995). 
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Terry stop meet the threshold of Miranda custody, then Miranda 
warnings are required before the suspect of a Terry stop may be 
interrogated.7 
This note argues that the determination of whether a suspect is 
in “Miranda custody” does not turn on the legality of the Terry 
stop. Part I will review Terry v. Ohio and present the dramatic 
expansion of the scope of a Terry stop.8 Part II will review 
Miranda v. Arizona and explain how courts have neglected to 
clarify the definition of Miranda custody.9 Part III will survey the 
circuit split regarding Miranda’s application to a Terry stop.10 Part 
IV will argue for the Second Circuit’s independent approach, and 
finally Part V will evaluate documented criticisms of this 
proposal.11  
I. TERRY V. OHIO  
A. “Stop and Frisks:” An Exception to Probable Cause 
Under the Fourth Amendment,12 warrantless searches and 
seizures are presumed unreasonable.13 However, the Supreme 
Court has created several exceptions to the presumptive warrant 
requirement.14  
The Warren Court sanctioned one such exception in Terry v. 
                                                          
7 Newton, 369 F.3d at 673. 
8 See infra Part I. 
9 See infra Part II. 
10 See infra Part III. 
11 See infra Part IV; Part V. 
12 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be 
secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”). 
13 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
14 See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) 
(permitting a warrantless entry of a home when police have an objectively 
reasonable basis for believing that a person within the home is seriously 
injured or threatened with injury); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 
414 (1976) (permitting a public arrest in the absence of a warrant); Warden 
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (permitting a warrantless search that is 
justified when officers are in “hot pursuit”). 
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Ohio.15 “Where a police officer observes . . . conduct which 
leads him reasonably to conclude . . . that criminal activity may 
be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be 
armed and presently dangerous . . . he is entitled for the 
protection of himself and others . . . to conduct” a search 
reasonably related in scope to the initial justification for the 
search.16 In Terry, a police officer observed two pedestrians, 
Terry and Chilton, conducting “elaborately casual and oft-
repeated reconnaissance” in front of a store window.17 The 
officer approached the two pedestrians, along with a third man 
with whom they were meeting, identified himself as a police 
officer, patted down the outside of Terry’s clothing, and found a 
.38-caliber revolver.18 He discovered another revolver in 
Chilton’s overcoat pocket.19 After disarming the men, Chilton 
and Terry were formally charged with carrying concealed 
weapons.20  
The issue presented to the Warren Court was whether “in all 
the circumstances of this on-the-street encounter, [Terry’s] right 
to personal security was violated by an unreasonable search and 
seizure.”21 The Court analyzed the reasonableness of the search 
by balancing the government’s interest in law enforcement and 
public safety with the “nature and quality of the intrusion on 
individual rights.”22 
First, the Court “emphatically”23 rejected the notion that a 
“stop and frisk” did not implicate the Fourth Amendment.24 
                                                          
15 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).  
16 Id. at 30. 
17 Id. at 6. 
18 Id. at 7. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 9. 
22 Id. at 24. 
23 Id. at 16. 
24 Id.  
It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an 
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has “seized” 
that person. And it is nothing less than sheer torture of the English 
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Second, the Court considered the societal importance of 
permitting police officers to investigate their suspicions of 
criminal or dangerous activity with less than probable cause.25 
Chief Justice Warren noted that while law enforcement has an 
interest in effective crime prevention and detection,26 there is an 
additional, more “immediate interest” concerning a police 
officer’s safety and assurance that he is not dealing with an 
armed individual.27 Thus, the Court agreed that police officers 
must be afforded an effective tool to protect themselves and the 
public in situations where they may lack probable cause for a 
search or arrest.28 
Finally, the Court balanced the needs of law enforcement 
and public safety against the intrusion of privacy.29 Chief Justice 
Warren acknowledged that “even a limited search of the outer 
clothing for weapons constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion 
upon cherished personal security, and it must surely be an 
annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience.”30 
Regardless, the proper compromise between the competing 
interests of law enforcement and civil rights permitted a narrow 
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause 
requirement.31 The Court stressed that “[t]he sole justification” 
of a Terry stop is the “protection of the police officer and others 
nearby . . . .”32  
                                                          
language to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of 
a person’s clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find 
weapons is not a “search.” Moreover, it is simply fantastic to urge 
that such a procedure performed in public by a policeman while the 
citizen stands helpless . . . is a petty indignity.  
Id. 
25 Id. at 22. 
26 Id.  
27 Id. at 23. 
28 Id. at 24. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 29. 
32 Id. 
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B. The Expansion of Terry 
The permissible degree of intrusion during a “stop and frisk” 
has significantly expanded since 1968.33 In Terry, the Court 
permitted a “carefully limited search of the outer 
clothing . . . in an attempt to discover weapons which might be 
used to assault [the police officer].”34 Early cases following 
Terry interpreted this rule narrowly, hesitant to stray too far 
from this limited exception to the probable cause requirement.35 
In United States v. Strickler, for example, because police 
officers encircled the defendant in his car with their weapons 
raised,36 the Ninth Circuit found it impossible to “equate [this] 
armed approach to a surrounded vehicle whose occupants have 
been commanded to raise their hands with the ‘brief stop of a 
suspicious individual in order to determine his identity or to 
maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more 
information’ . . . .”37 Accordingly, the Terry stop was 
unreasonable.38  
In United States v. McLemure, the Tenth Circuit rejected the 
government’s argument that an officer acted reasonably when he 
drew his weapon, forced the defendant to lie face down, and 
conducted a pat down.39 Construing Terry narrowly, the court 
                                                          
33 See United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d 1193, 1198 (7th Cir. 1990). 
34 Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 
35 See United States v. O’Looney, 544 F.2d 385, 390 (9th Cir. 1976) 
(finding a Terry stop valid, in part because of the absence of drawn weapons, 
handcuffs, force, and threats thereof); see also United States v. McLemure, 
573 F.2d 1154 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Strickler, 490 F.2d 378 
(9th Cir. 1974).  
36 Strickler, 490 F.2d 378–79. The Ninth Circuit concluded that “[t]he 
restriction of Strickler’s ‘liberty of movement’ was complete when he was 
encircled by police and confronted with official orders made at 
gunpoint . . . [n]o significant, new restraint was added when Officer Ripley, 
a few moments later, handcuffed Strickler and formally pronounced him 
‘under arrest.’” Id. at 380 (internal citations omitted). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 United States v. McLemure, 573 F.2d 1154, 1156 (10th Cir. 1978). 
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concluded the Terry stop was unreasonable.40 Similarly, the 
defendant in Dunaway v. New York 41 was transported against his 
will to the local police station and held in an interrogation room 
where he was not free to leave.42 The Court held the police 
conduct exceeded the brief detention authorized by Terry 
because “in contrast to the brief and narrowly circumscribed 
intrusions involved in those cases, the detention of petitioner 
was in important respects indistinguishable from a traditional 
arrest.”43 
More recently, however, the permissible degree of intrusion 
permitted during a Terry stop has expanded far beyond the “stop 
and frisk” originally upheld by the Supreme Court,44 presumably 
as courts responded to rising violent crime.45 In Florida v. 
Royer,46 the Court acknowledged, “the predicate permitting 
seizures on suspicion short of probable cause is that law 
enforcement interests warrant a limited intrusion on the personal 
security of the suspect,”47 but opened the door to Terry’s 
expansion by explaining in dicta that “the scope of the intrusion 
will vary” with the circumstances of each case.48 In United 
                                                          
40 Id. 
41 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). 
42 Id. at 202–03. 
43 Id. 
44 The cases discussed in this section are not intended to be exhaustive, 
but merely describe the willingness of courts to permit increasingly coercive 
police conduct during Terry stops. 
45 “The number of police officers killed annually in the line of duty has 
tripled since Terry was decided; the number of those assaulted and wounded 
has risen by a factor of twenty.” United States v. Micheletti, 13 F.3d 838, 
844 (5th Cir. 1994). 
46 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). In Royer, the defendant 
purchased an airline ticket under an assumed name. He was questioned by 
police officers and his suitcases were searched. Royer moved to suppress the 
evidence obtained by the search of his suitcases. The Court ultimately 
determined that the detainment and search of Royer exceeded the legal scope 
of an investigative stop, and the evidence was suppressed. Id. at 493–501. 
47 Id. at 500. 
48 Id.  
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States v. Perdue,49 police officers approached the defendant’s car 
with their weapons drawn and ordered the defendant to step out 
and lie facedown on the ground.50 Then, the police allegedly 
handcuffed the defendant and questioned him.51 The Tenth 
Circuit concluded that while the officers’ warrantless seizure of 
Perdue “border[ed] on an illegal arrest,” it was nonetheless a 
reasonable Terry stop because the intrusion was justified by the 
potentially dangerous circumstances of the encounter.52  
In United States v. Quinn,53 police parked their cars behind 
the defendant’s vehicle, blocked his exit, and questioned him for 
twenty minutes until more officers arrived with drug-sniffing 
dogs.54 The court concluded that the Terry stop was lawful and 
saw “no way that the agents could have greatly shortened their 
inquiry if they were to ‘confirm or dispel their suspicions’ 
meaningfully.”55 Additionally, the Quinn court observed the 
emerging patchwork of law regarding the lawfulness of Terry 
stops:  
                                                          
49 United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1993). 
50 Id. at 1458–59. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 1462 (“It was not unreasonable under the circumstances for the 
officers to execute the Terry stop with their weapons drawn. While Terry 
stops generally must be fairly nonintrusive [sic], officers may take necessary 
steps to protect themselves if the circumstances reasonably warrant such 
measures. ‘[T]he use of guns in connection with a stop is permissible where 
the police reasonably believe [the weapons] are necessary for their 
protection.’ United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1273 (10th Cir. 1982). 
Similarly, other circuits have held that police officers may draw their 
weapons without transforming an otherwise valid Terry stop into an arrest. 
See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 899 F.2d 833, 838 (9th Cir. 1990); 
United States v. Taylor, 857 F.2d 210, 214 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. 
Serna-Barreto, 842 F.2d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Jones, 
759 F.2d 633, 638 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Jackson, 652 F.2d 244, 
249 (2d Cir. 1981).”) (internal citations omitted). “The Fourth Amendment 
does not require that officers unnecessarily risk their lives when encountering 
a suspect whom they reasonably believe to be armed and dangerous.” Id. at 
1463. 
53 United States v. Quinn, 815 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1987). 
54 Id. at 155–56. 
55 Id. at 158. 
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[a]dmittedly, Terry, Dunaway, Royer, and Place,56 
considered together, may in some instances create 
difficult line-drawing problems in distinguishing an 
investigative stop from a de facto arrest . . . . But our 
cases impose no rigid time limitation on Terry stops. 
While it is clear that “the brevity of the invasion of the 
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests is an important 
factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally 
intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable 
suspicion,” . . . we have emphasized the need to 
consider the law enforcement purposes to be served by 
the stop as well as the time reasonably needed to 
effectuate those purposes.57 
Thus, Quinn acknowledged the increasing deference given to 
law enforcement in their administration of a Terry stop. 
A year later, in United States v. Serna-Barreto, Judge 
Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, deemed a Terry stop 
valid when the investigating officer “pointed his gun at . . . [the 
defendant] . . . [and] ordered her out of the car.”58 The court 
upheld the stop, in large part because “many drug traffickers are 
armed and they sometimes shoot policemen”59 and because the 
defendant “testified that she was not scared by the gun.”60 
Similarly, in United States v. Greene61 and United States v. 
Hardnett,62 the Ninth and Sixth Circuits, respectively, deemed a 
                                                          
56 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
57 Quinn, 815 F.2d at 159 (footnotes citing cases mentioned therein 
added). 
58 United States v. Serna-Barreto, 842 F.2d 965, 967 (7th Cir. 1988). 
59 Id. at 967. 
60 Id. at 968.  
Although subjective belief is not determinative on whether an 
ostensible stop is actually an arrest, Serna-Barreto’s testimony is 
strong evidence in an otherwise sketchy record that, if Officer 
Dailey did in fact point his gun at her, he did so in a manner that 
protected him without unduly threatening her.  
Id. 
61 United States v. Greene, 783 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1986). 
62 United States v. Hardnett, 804 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1986). 
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warrantless investigative stop valid under Terry even though the 
officer’s weapons were drawn.63 
The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in United States v. Tilmon64 
best illustrates the scope of the expansion of Terry.65 In Tilmon, 
police were looking for a suspected bank robber.66 A police 
officer spotted the vehicle described in the radio dispatch and 
called for back-up units; he noted the driver “‘slid down in the 
drivers seat’ as the police car approached . . . .”67 Next, 
the police cars activated their flashing lights and Tilmon 
pulled over. Over a loud speaker, Tilmon was 
informed . . . that he should get out of the car with his 
hands up and lie face down on the shoulder of the road. 
Tilmon immediately complied. (According to Officer 
Klanderman, some of the weapons were pointed at 
Tilmon, and some were pointed at his car.) After he lay 
down as directed, Tilmon was handcuffed and placed in a 
squad car. A shotgun was pointed at Tilmon’s head while 
he was handcuffed, searched and seated in the squad car 
. . . . At the scene of the highway stop, Tilmon’s car had 
been effectively blocked. There were at least five squad 
cars abreast of and behind his car, and another police car 
stopped one-quarter mile ahead of Tilmon’s car on the 
shoulder of the road . . . . Officer Klanderman testified 
that drawing weapons was standard procedure for a 
felony stop “for the safety of the officers and any other 
persons that may be in the area.”68 
In rejecting Tilmon’s argument that the warrantless stop was 
so forceful as to constitute a de facto arrest, and thus a violation 
                                                          
63 See Greene, 783 F.2d at 1367; Hardnett, 804 F.2d at 357. 
64 United States v. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221 (7th Cir. 1993). 
65 Id. Tilmon has been cited as recently as April 11, 2008, specifically 
for its proposition that if found to be justified, requiring a suspect to lie face 
down while being handcuffed and/or briefly detained in an officer’s squad car 
does not convert a Terry stop into an arrest. Jewett v. Anders, 521 F.3d 818, 
825–26 (7th Cir. 2008).  
66 Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1223. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
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of the Fourth Amendment, the court recited the elements of a 
valid Terry stop:  
[t]he reasonableness of an investigatory stop may be 
determined by examining: (1) whether the police were 
aware of specific and articulable facts giving rise to 
reasonable suspicion; and (2) whether the degree of 
intrusion was reasonably related to the known facts. In 
other words, the issue is whether the police conduct—
given their suspicions and the surrounding 
circumstances—was reasonable.69 
The court concluded that the “police justifiably held a reasonable 
suspicion that the car and its driver were involved in a bank 
robbery.”70 Moreover, it found that based on the circumstances 
of this particular matter—specifically that the suspect was 
thought to be an armed felon—the scope of the intrusion was 
reasonable.71 The court emphasized the risks posed to law 
enforcement, particularly in a “felony stop:”72  
[w]hen effecting a Terry stop . . . police officers must 
make a quick decision about how to protect themselves 
and others from possible danger. They are not 
necessarily required to “adopt alternative means to ensure 
their safety in order to avoid the intrusion involved in a 
Terry encounter.” A court in its assessment “should take 
care to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly 
developing situation, and in such cases the court should 
not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing.”73 
Thus, “[t]o require an officer to risk his life in order to 
make an investigatory stop would run contrary to the intent of 
Terry v. Ohio.”74 Finally, the Tilmon court took notice of 
Terry’s expansion: 
                                                          
69 Id. at 1224 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1968)). 
70 Id. at 1225. 
71 Id. at 1227. 
72 Id. at 1225–26. 
73 Id. at 1225 (citations omitted). 
74 Id. at 1226 (citing United States v. Maslanka, 501 F.2d 208, 213 n.10 
(5th Cir. 1974)). 
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[i]n the recent past, the “permissible reasons for a stop 
and search and the permissible scope of the intrusion 
[under the Terry doctrine] have expanded beyond their 
original contours.” The last decade “has witnessed a 
multifaceted expansion of Terry,” including the “trend 
granting officers greater latitude in using force in order 
to ‘neutralize’ potentially dangerous suspects during an 
investigatory detention.” For better or for worse, the 
trend has led to the permitting of the use of handcuffs, 
the placing of suspects in police cruisers, the drawing of 
weapons and other measures of force more traditionally 
associated with arrest than with investigatory detention.75 
The court’s language makes clear that the justifications for 
the stark departure from Terry’s narrow holding are the same as 
the policy considerations that encouraged its advancement in the 
first place. The increase in violent crime, gun violence, 
America’s war on illegal drugs, and criminal sophistication since 
1968 has enhanced the dangers associated with law 
enforcement.76 Once the Supreme Court permitted an exception 
to the probable cause requirement, lower courts that evaluated 
the legality of officers’ actions on a case-by-case basis felt 
compelled to maximize the tools officers had to protect their 
safety.77 
                                                          
75 Id. at 1224–25 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
76 “The number of police officers killed annually in the line of duty has 
tripled since Terry was decided; the numbers of those assaulted and wounded 
have risen by a factor of twenty.” United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838, 
844 (5th Cir. 1994). 
77 In sum, in 1963, Officer McFadden stopped a person he reasonably 
believed to be preparing for a robbery and frisked his outer clothing for the 
presence of a weapon that could serve to harm the police officer or the 
public. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 7, 23, 28 (1968). In 1992, Spencer Ray 
Tilmon was surrounded by five police cars and numerous police officers 
whose arms were drawn, laid down on the ground on an interstate highway, 
handcuffed while a shotgun was pointed at his head, and placed in a squad 
car during the search of his car. United States v. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221, 
1223 (7th Cir. 1994). Both courts found the officers had the requisite specific 
and articulable facts to support reasonable suspicion of the defendants’ 
propensity for crime or imposition of public danger, and both courts 
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II. MIRANDA V. ARIZONA: PROTECTING THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST 
SELF-INCRIMINATION 
A. Miranda v. Arizona 
Two years before Terry, the Warren Court addressed the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination78 in 
Miranda v. Arizona.79 In the consolidated cases decided in 
Miranda, police questioned a suspect in custody at the precinct 
for an extended period of time, eventually eliciting a 
confession.80 The Court set out to decide the trial admissibility of 
statements obtained from questioning which shared certain 
“salient features [including] incommunicado interrogation of 
individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere [that] result[ed] in 
self-incriminating statements without full warnings of 
constitutional rights.”81  
The Warren Court sought to ensure that suspects’ Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was adequately 
protected during the course of custodial interrogation.82 Miranda 
responded to the coercive nature that a police-dominated 
environment has on the will of a suspect in custody;83 that is, 
when police conduct psychologically coercive in-custody 
interrogation techniques, procedural safeguards must be 
employed to offset their effect. First, the Court reiterated that 
the Fifth Amendment privilege is available “outside of criminal 
court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in 
which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way 
                                                          
concluded that the intrusiveness of the subsequent search was reasonable 
under the circumstances and sufficiently limited in scope. See Terry, 392 
U.S. at 30; Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1225, 1228. 
78 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”). 
79 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966). 
80 Id. at 440. 
81 Id. at 445. 
82 Id. at 439. 
83 See id. at 443. 
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from being compelled to incriminate themselves.”84 Second, the 
court emphasized that “an understanding of the nature and 
setting of this in-custody interrogation is essential” to the 
Court’s holding.85 In light of the one-sided nature of police 
interrogation and the value of the privilege against self-
incrimination,86 the Court held that the “prosecution may not use 
statements, stemming from custodial interrogation of the 
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural 
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination.”87 These required procedural safeguards must 
inform the defendant that “he has the right to remain silent, that 
any statement he does make may be used as evidence against 
him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney.”88 
Accordingly, Miranda warnings are required when the subject is 
(1) in police custody and (2) interrogated by the police.89 The 
Court defined custodial interrogation as “questioning initiated by 
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into 
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way.”90 Subsequent lower courts have struggled to 
identify the appropriate threshold of custody and interrogation 
that triggers Miranda. 
1. Miranda Custody 
The Supreme Court specifically addressed whether an 
                                                          
84 Id. at 467. 
85 Id. at 445. The Court commented on the history of physically abusive 
interrogation tactics, but stressed that coercion can be mental as well as 
physical. See id. at 446, 449. In the Court’s own words, the compulsion 
directed towards suspects stems from the individual being “swept from 
familiar surroundings,” being “surrounded by antagonistic forces,” and being 
“subject to techniques intended to subjugate the individual to the will of his 
examiner.” Id. at 457, 461. 
86 Id. at 468. 
87 Id. at 444. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. The Court did not articulate with further specificity factors 
indicative of custodial interrogation. 
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arrestee was in sufficient custody as to warrant Miranda 
warnings in Orozco v. Texas.91 Justice Black rejected the state’s 
argument that since the suspect was in familiar surroundings (his 
bedroom), Miranda did not apply.92 Instead, the Court laid down 
a bright-line rule: if a person is arrested, he is in custody for 
purposes of Miranda.93  
In California v. Beheler,94 the suspect agreed to accompany 
police officers to the police station for questioning.95 The suspect 
was informed he was not under arrest. He left, unrestrained, 
after the questioning.96 The Court stated: 
although the circumstances of each case must certainly 
influence a determination of whether a suspect is “in 
custody” for purposes of receiving of Miranda 
protection, the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is 
a “formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement” of 
the degree associated with a formal arrest . . . [b]ut we 
have explicitly recognized that Miranda warnings are not 
required “simply because the questioning takes place in 
the station house, or because the questioned person is one 
whom the police suspect.”97 
Accordingly, the Court found that Beheler was not in 
custody for Miranda purposes, forcefully explaining, “it is 
beyond doubt that Beheler was neither taken into custody nor 
significantly deprived of his freedom of action. Indeed, 
                                                          
91 Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969). 
92 Id. at 326. 
93 Id. at 326–27. Justice White’s dissent expressed disdain that the 
custody requirement of Miranda was “dilute[d].” Id. at 330. Relying on the 
language in Miranda that focused on the extremes and coerciveness of in-
house custodial interrogations, Justice White argued that Miranda and the 
policies underlying it were not meant to reach beyond the police station and 
criticized the majority for assuming, without discussion, that it did so. Id. at 
329. 
94 California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983). 
95 Id. at 1122. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 1125. 
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Beheler’s freedom was not restricted in any way whatsoever.”98  
The Supreme Court’s next significant decision regarding 
Miranda custody came in Berkemer v. McCarty.99 In this case, 
an Ohio state highway patrolman stopped a suspect weaving in 
and out of a highway lane.100 At the scene of the traffic stop, the 
officer asked the suspect if he had been using intoxicants and the 
suspect replied that he had “consumed two beers and had 
smoked several joints of marijuana . . . .”101 The suspect was 
arrested and later sought to have those statements suppressed on 
the grounds that he was not first read his Miranda rights at the 
scene of the traffic stop before his arrest.102 The Court held that 
“roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a 
routine traffic stop” was not “custodial interrogation.”103 The 
Court acknowledged that a usual traffic stop is analogous to a 
Terry stop and the nature of these detentions (Terry stops) 
“explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that 
Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda.”104 The Court 
concluded, “fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda105 
requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in those types of 
situations in which the concerns that powered the decision are 
implicated.”106  
In United States v. Brown,107 the Eighth Circuit suggested six 
indicia for determining whether a suspect is in custody for 
Miranda purposes: 
                                                          
98 Id. at 1123. 
99 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984). 
100 Id. at 423. 
101 Id. 
102 See id. at 424. 
103 Id. at 435. Berkemer also established an objective test to determine 
whether a suspect was “subjected to treatment that renders him ‘in custody:’” 
the “relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would 
have understood his situation.” Id. at 440, 442. 
104 Id. at 440. 
105 Id. at 437. Specifically, the Court was referring to the phrase 
“deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way.” Id. at 428. 
106 Id. at 437. 
107 United States v. Brown, 990 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1993). 
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(1) whether the suspect was informed at the time of 
questioning that the questioning was voluntary, that the 
suspect was free to leave or request the officers to do so, 
or that the suspect was not considered under arrest; (2) 
whether the suspect possessed unrestrained freedom of 
movement during questioning; (3) whether the suspect 
initiated contact with authorities or voluntarily acquiesced 
to official request to respond to questions; (4) whether 
strong arm tactics or deceptive stratagems were employed 
during questioning; (5) whether the atmosphere of the 
questioning was police dominated; and (6) whether the 
suspect was placed under arrest at the termination of the 
questioning.108 
Even if a person is in custody, however, he or she must still 
be “interrogated” in order to trigger Miranda.109 
2. Miranda Interrogation 
Miranda defined interrogation as “questioning initiated by 
law enforcement officers,”110 but the Court has maintained that 
investigatory tactics other than direct questioning can be 
“interrogation.” In Rhode Island v. Innis,111 the Court held that 
“the term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to 
express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part 
of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and 
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”112 
                                                          
108 Id. at 399. “The presence of the first three indicia tends to mitigate 
the existence of custody at the time of questioning” while the “presence of 
the last three indicia aggravate the existence of custody.” Id. 
109 See Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 1244 (3d Cir. 1994). 
110 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
111 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). 
112 Id. at 301. 
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III. THE CIRCUITS’ SPLIT OVER MIRANDA’S APPLICABILITY TO 
TERRY STOPS 
Terry’s expansion to permit increasingly coercive searches 
and seizures113 has caught up to Miranda. The First and Fourth 
Circuits reason that if the Terry stop is lawful under the Fourth 
Amendment, then the suspect is not in Miranda custody.114 
Conversely, the Second, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth 
Circuits consider the Fourth and Fifth Amendment questions 
separately, holding that a Terry stop may be lawful under the 
Fourth Amendment, but may still rise to a degree of intrusion 
that constitutes Miranda custody.115 
A. The First and Fourth Circuits’ Categorical Approach 
The First and Fourth Circuits extend the holding of 
Berkemer from traffic stops to all lawful Terry stops, holding 
that if a Terry stop based upon reasonable suspicion is lawful at 
inception and in scope, then the suspect is not in Miranda 
custody.116 In other words, they apply a categorical rule that only 
if a Terry stop rises to the level of a de facto arrest, and thus is 
no longer a lawful Terry stop, would Miranda warnings be 
required. 
In United States v. Trueber,117 for example, police officers 
garnered reasonable suspicion that Trueber was smuggling 
drugs.118 Officers spoke with Trueber for ten-to-fifteen minutes 
                                                          
113 See supra Part I(B).  
114 United States v. Trueber, 238 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2001); United States 
v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1995). 
115 In United States v. Artiles–Martin, Judge Hodges noted that “[t]he 
First [and] Fourth . . . Circuits hold that so-called Terry reasonableness 
means Miranda warnings are not required, even if the stop was 
coercive . . . [while] the Second, Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits hold that 
a coercive Terry stop requires warnings but still is deemed a valid Terry 
stop.” United States v. Artiles–Martin, No. 5:08-cr-14-Oc-10GRJ, 2008 WL 
2600787, *11 n.38 (M.D. Fla. June 30, 2008). 
116 Trueber, 238 F.3d 79; Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105. 
117 Trueber, 238 F.3d 79. 
118 Id. at 82. 
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after pulling his truck over, and then for approximately one hour 
and twenty minutes further at his motel room.119 Agents kept 
Trueber under constant surveillance.120 Trueber was then 
arrested.121 The lower court suppressed all statements made by 
Trueber before his arrest, reasoning that “for purposes of 
Miranda, Trueber was in custody when questioned and, 
therefore, all statements violated Miranda and should be 
suppressed.”122  
On appeal, the First Circuit concurred with Berkemer that 
“routine traffic stops are more analogous to a Terry stop than to 
a formal arrest, and, therefore, are not custodial for purposes of 
Miranda.”123 The court concluded that “the investigatory stop 
was justified at its inception and reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first 
place . . . [w]hat occurred was thus a permissible Terry stop.”124 
Since “[n]othing the agents did or said sufficed to convert the 
investigatory stop into an arrest requiring the administration of 
Miranda warnings,” the statements’ suppression was 
overturned.125 Trueber’s focus, on whether the stop was lawful 
or whether it exceeded the scope of a Terry stop to become a de 
facto arrest thus requiring Miranda warnings,126 suggests that 
only upon the latter circumstance, and never upon the former, 
would Miranda warnings be required.127  
The Fourth Circuit also applies a categorical rule with regard 
to Miranda’s applicability to Terry stops. In United States v. 
                                                          
119 Id. at 84–85. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 87. 
122 Id. at 91. 
123 Id. at 92 (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984)). 
124 Id. at 95 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
125 Id.  
126 Id. 
127 A lower court in the First Circuit appears to have deviated from 
Trueber’s holding. In United States v. Massaro, the district court asserted 
that the First Circuit would recognize that “even during a lawful Terry stop, 
the restraint of a suspect can amount to a formal arrest.” United States v. 
Massaro, 560 F. Supp. 2d 96, 105 (D. Mass. 2008). 
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Leshuk,128 a turkey hunter uncovered marijuana growing in the 
woods.129 He alerted the police, and deputy sheriffs found the 
two defendants nearby with two backpacks and a brown plastic 
garbage bag in their possession.130 The deputies ordered the 
defendants to raise their hands, frisked them, and “determined 
they were not armed.”131 The deputies then asked several 
questions that the defendants answered.132 On appeal, Leshuk 
argued that his statements made during the deputies’ questioning 
at the scene, before his arrest, “should be suppressed because 
the deputies improperly interrogated him without administering 
warnings pursuant to Miranda.”133 The Leshuk court found that 
the officers’ conduct did not exceed the scope of a lawful Terry 
stop.134 The court distinguished a Terry stop from a custodial 
interrogation by noting that a Terry stop “must last no longer 
than necessary to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion.”135  
In sum, the First and Fourth Circuits have adopted a 
categorical rule that extends Berkemer’s holding: if the Terry 
stop was lawful, then the suspect was not in Miranda custody. 
However, not all circuits agree with this approach. 
B. The Second, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits’ 
Independent Approach 
These circuits reason that because a lawful Terry stop may 
include behavior commensurate with a formal arrest, a detainee 
of a lawful Terry stop, that is, a stop that does not rise to the 
level of a de facto arrest, may still be entitled to Miranda 
warnings. 
                                                          
128 United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1995). 
129 Id. at 1106–07. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 1107. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 1108. 
134 Id. at 1110. 
135 Id. at 1109. 
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1. Second Circuit 
In United States v. Newton,136 three parole officers and three 
police officers arrived at the Wrights’ apartment upon word that 
the Wrights’ son, Newton, had threatened to kill the Wrights.137 
The officers handcuffed Newton without advising him of his 
Miranda rights, explaining that it was for his and the officers’ 
safety, and that he was not under arrest.138 Newton thereafter 
told the police that he had a gun in his apartment and where it 
was.139 On appeal to the Second Circuit, Newton asserted that 
his responses to inquiries from the officers ought to have been 
suppressed because his restraint rose to a degree consistent with 
that of formal custody but was not preceded by Miranda 
warnings.140 
The court rejected the categorical approach of the First and 
Fourth Circuit—that “where an investigatory stop is reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment, the seized suspect is not ‘in 
custody’ for purposes of Miranda.”141 Rather, the Second Circuit 
found that Fourth Amendment reasonableness is not the standard 
for resolving Miranda custody challenges.142 In other words, 
“whether a ‘stop’ was permissible under Terry v. Ohio . . . is 
irrelevant to the Miranda analysis. Terry is an ‘exception’ to the 
Fourth Amendment probable cause requirement, not to the Fifth 
Amendment protections against self-incrimination.”143 Instead, 
the Second Circuit asked whether a “reasonable person in 
defendant’s position would have understood himself to be 
subjected to the restraints comparable to those associated with a 
formal arrest.”144 Facts the court deemed relevant included:  
(1) the length of time involved in the stop; (2) its public 
                                                          
136 United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659 (2d Cir. 2004). 
137 Id. at 663. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 663–64. 
140 Id. at 668. 
141 Id. at 673 (citing Trueber and Leshuk). 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. (citing United States v. Ali, 69 F.3d 1467, 1472 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
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or private setting; (3) the number of participating law 
enforcement officers; (4) the risk of danger presented by 
the person stopped; and (5) the display or use of physical 
force against the person stopped, including firearms, 
handcuffs, and leg irons.145  
The court’s willingness to extend Miranda protections to 
lawful Terry stops did not invalidate the lawfulness of the Terry 
stop: “the Fourth Amendment permits the officer to take 
‘necessary measures . . . to neutralize the threat’ without 
converting a reasonable stop into a de facto arrest.”146 
Accordingly, the Terry stop was reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, but “nevertheless placed him in custody for 
purposes of Miranda.”147 
2. Seventh Circuit 
United States v. Smith148 considered whether a suspect 
detained and handcuffed during a Terry stop should have been 
read Miranda warnings.149 The court explained, “[t]he purpose 
of permitting a temporary detention without probable cause or a 
warrant is to protect police officers and the general 
public . . . [but] [t]he purpose of the Miranda rule, however, is 
                                                          
145 Id. at 674. 
146 Id. This is consistent with the Second Circuit’s decision in United 
States v. Ali, 68 F.3d 1468, 1473 (2d Cir. 1995): 
Terry is an “exception” to the Fourth Amendment probable cause 
requirement, not to the Fifth Amendment protections against self-
incrimination . . . . The fact that the seizure and search of a suspect 
comports with the Fourth Amendment under Terry simply does not 
determine whether the suspect’s contemporaneous oral admissions 
may be used against him or her at trial. 
147 Id. at 677. However, since these statements fell within the public 
safety exception to Miranda, under New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 
(1984), the court did not err in refusing to suppress Newton’s statements. 
United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 677 (2d Cir. 2004). 
148 United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088 (7th Cir. 1993). 
149 Id. at 1094. “We will not substitute our judgment for that of the 
officers as to the best methods to investigate.” Id. (quoting United States v. 
Boden, 854 F.2d 983, 993 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
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not to protect the police or the public . . . [but to] protect the 
fairness of the trial.”150 Thus, the court read Berkemer to stand 
for the proposition that Miranda rights may be triggered even if 
a defendant has not been subjected to an arrest or a de facto 
arrest.151  
3. Eighth Circuit 
In United States v. Martinez, a suspect was placed in 
handcuffs, patted down for weapons, detained, and interrogated 
about his possession of weapons and cash.152 The court ruled that 
the encounter was a valid Terry stop, but nonetheless continued 
to analyze whether the suspect was in Miranda custody.153 After 
rejecting the government’s argument “that so long as the 
encounter remained a Terry stop, no Miranda warnings were 
required,”154 the court “followed the Supreme Court’s cue” and 
read Berkemer to imply that the dispositive consideration is not 
whether the encounter was a valid Terry stop, but what the 
circumstances of the stop were.155 The court ultimately 
determined that the detainee, despite not being under arrest 
during the lawful Terry stop, was entitled to Miranda 
warnings.156 
4. Ninth Circuit 
In United States v. Kim,157 the Ninth Circuit held that the 
lower court correctly suppressed the defendant’s statements 
                                                          
150 Id. at 1097. 
151 Id. 
152 United States v. Martinez, 462 F.3d 903, 906 (8th Cir. 2006). 
153 Id. at 908 (“Whether Martinez was ‘in custody’ for purposes of 
Miranda after being handcuffed during the Terry stop is a separate question 
from whether that handcuffing constituted an arrest for which probable cause 
was required.”). 
154 Id. at 909 (emphasis added). 
155 Id. 
156 Id.  
157 United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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during the course of a Terry stop because “under the totality of 
circumstances, a reasonable person in Kim’s circumstances 
would not have felt free to leave,” and therefore Kim was in 
Miranda custody.158 The court ruled so, despite the fact the 
defendant was not under arrest, because “the circumstances 
during the questioning of the defendant warranted advising [her] 
of her rights.”159 
5. Tenth Circuit 
In United States v. Perdue,160 police conducting an 
investigative stop ordered the defendant and his fiancée to get 
out of their stopped car and lie face down.161 The officers drew 
their guns as the defendant made various statements regarding 
marijuana in his vehicle.162 The defendant appealed the district 
court’s decision not to suppress his statements, challenging the 
lower court’s conclusion that since he was interrogated during a 
valid Terry stop, Miranda warnings were not required.163 
The Perdue court concluded that the district court “merged 
several distinct constitutional inquiries into one.”164 The court 
first held that the officer’s investigative stop of Perdue was a 
valid Terry stop.165 Next, the court acknowledged that Miranda 
rights might be implicated during a valid Terry stop because 
“[p]olice officers must make a choice—if they are going to take 
highly intrusive steps to protect themselves from danger, they 
must similarly provide protection to their suspects by advising 
                                                          
158 Id. at 978.  
159 Id. at 973. 
160 United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1993). 
161 Id. at 1458. 
162 Id. at 1459. 
163 Id. at 1461. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 1463. The court concluded that under the circumstances, the use 
of drawing their weapons and displaying some force was reasonable. Id. at 
1462. The court also noted that this conduct “border[ed] on an illegal arrest.” 
Id. 
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them of their constitutional rights.”166 Because “[a] reasonable 
man in Mr. Perdue’s position could not have misunderstood the 
fact that if he did not immediately cooperate, his life would be 
in danger . . . [and] [a]ny reasonable person in Mr. Perdue’s 
position would have felt completely at the mercy of the police,” 
Perdue was in Miranda custody.167 
Thus, contrary to the categorical rule adopted by the First 
and Fourth Circuits, the above circuits have adopted an 
independent approach by which the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment issues are analyzed separately.  
IV. THE INDEPENDENT APPROACH HAS IT RIGHT 
Ultimately, evaluating Miranda custody separately and 
distinctly from the legality of the underlying Terry stop best 
balances law enforcement interests with suspects’ Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment rights. The First and Fourth Circuits’ 
categorical rule that Terry detainees are not in Miranda custody 
ignores the extension of Terry stops from a simple stop-and-frisk 
to police seizures that include drawn weapons, limited force, 
interrogation, and detention.168 As a result, their approach fails 
to recognize that these intrusive techniques approach precisely 
the sort of coercive atmosphere that sparked the need for 
Miranda’s prophylactic rule. Alternatively, the independent 
approach, adopted by the Second Circuit and others, supports 
the policy justifications behind Terry and Miranda. This 
approach, coupled with courts continuing their efforts to clarify 
what restraints constitute Miranda custody and applying the 
public safety exception promulgated in New York v. Quarles169 to 
Terry stops, minimizes burdens on law enforcement.  
                                                          
166 Id. at 1465.  
167 Id. (quoting United States v. Berkemer, 468 U.S. 420, 438 (1984)). 
168 See generally id. at 1462. 
169 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). 
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A. The Second Circuit’s Approach Best Balances Suspects’ 
Rights with Law Enforcement Interests 
Newton’s approach, shared by the Seventh, Eight, Ninth, and 
Tenth Circuits,170 displays more sensible constitutional law by 
acknowledging and accepting the increasingly coercive nature of 
the Terry stop and applying distinct Miranda analysis without 
disturbing it. 
First, an independent approach concedes that different values 
underlie Terry and Miranda. Terry values the balance between 
an individual’s right to privacy against law enforcement’s goal 
of public safety.171 Miranda values a suspect’s privilege against 
self-incrimination.172 Just as a prophylactic rule protecting a 
person’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is 
distinct from a person’s Fourth Amendment right against 
unreasonable search and seizure, so too should Miranda custody 
analysis be distinct from Fourth Amendment reasonableness. Put 
simply, just because a Terry stop may be reasonable, the police 
officer’s conduct may still (lawfully) rise to the level imagined 
by Chief Justice Warren in Miranda. To disregard the possible 
applicability of Miranda warnings to this type of Terry stop 
ignores the values that motivated Miranda.  
Second, in Miranda, the Court held that warnings are not 
just applied to arrest custody, but also to custodial detentions 
that detain the suspect in any significant way.173 While Berkemer 
held that routine traffic stops do not rise to the level of detention 
imagined by Miranda,174 the facts of Berkemer are 
distinguishable from the ultra-coercive Terry stops described in 
Newton and Perdue. While these coercive Terry stops may still 
not constitute de facto arrests, their use of limited force, drawn 
weapons, handcuffs, and extended duration certainly resemble 
the compelling environment of an arrest more than a traffic stop.  
                                                          
170 See supra Part III(B). 
171 Terry, 392 at 23–28. 
172 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). 
173 Id. at 444. 
174 Berkemer v. McCarty, 458 U.S., 420, 437–40 (1984). 
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Third, categorical denial of Miranda to Terry stops assumes, 
incorrectly, that all Terry stops are intrusions on personal liberty 
not worthy of the prophylactic protections of Miranda.175 Just 
like not all arrests are the sort of police-dominated stationhouse 
interrogations imagined by Miranda, not all Terry stops are the 
minor intrusions on personal liberty imagined by Terry. 
Fourth, Chief Justice Warren, in Miranda, failed to actually 
define “custody” as an “arrest.”176 In fact, he failed to define 
“custody” at all.177 It is reasonable to conclude that the two were 
not intended by the Court to be synonymous. Analogously, just 
as Miranda was framed in the in-station police-dominated 
environment, Miranda warnings are now given to all arrests 
regardless of the degree of coerciveness of the environment. 
Since Miranda left the confines of the police station, it is not 
incongruous to argue it should leave the confines of a formal or 
de facto arrest.178 
Finally, the Berkemer Court admitted that a bright-line rule 
stating Miranda does not apply until a suspect is officially placed 
under arrest would “enable the police to circumvent the 
constraints on custodial interrogations established by 
Miranda.”179 By denying Miranda’s application to Terry stops, 
police may find incentive to put off an arrest until after they 
have finished questioning a detainee. 
B. More Concretely Define the Scope of Miranda Custody 
Courts applying the independent approach must clarify what 
restraints actually constitute Miranda custody in order to 
minimize the burdens on law enforcement that include over-
complication and exclusion of evidence at trial. In Newton, the 
                                                          
175 Richard A. Williamson, The Virtues (and Limits) of Shared Values: 
The Fourth Amendment and Miranda’s Concept of Custody, 1993 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 379, 409 (1993). 
176 Miranda, 384 U.S. 436. 
177 Id. 
178 See generally Williamson, supra note 175 (explaining the expansion of 
Miranda warnings beyond the traditional bounds of a formal arrest). 
179 Berkemer, 458 U.S. at 441. 
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Second Circuit noted the “difficulty of determining ‘custody’ for 
purposes of Miranda and the Supreme Court’s lack of clear 
guidance on the issue.”180 At least one commentator has noted 
that when Miranda was decided, the legal terms “custody” and 
“arrest” meant roughly the same thing.181 This is no longer the 
case,182 in part due to exceptions to the warrant requirement and 
increasing ambiguity as to the role and permissible substance of 
a Terry stop. If a court accepts the proposition that Miranda 
custody can be achieved without an arrest, it is irresponsible to 
expect police officers to determine when to deliver Miranda 
warnings based on an admittedly vague standard, and then 
punish their incorrect judgment by excluding statements made 
during the encounters.  
In Miranda, the Court stated specifically that an 
“understanding of the nature and setting of [an] in-custody 
interrogation is essential to” their decision.183 Since the nature 
and setting of interrogations has changed,184 so must the analysis 
of whether Miranda applies. 
While the Second and Eighth Circuits have identified factors 
to determine whether Miranda custody was met,185 these 
                                                          
180 United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 670 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing 
Cruz v. Miller, 255 F.3d 77, 86 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
181 Mark A. Godsey, When Terry Met Miranda: Two Constitutional 
Doctrines Collide, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 715, 741 (1994). 
182 Id. 
183 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966). 
184 Supra Part II(A)(i). 
185 See Newton, 369 F.3d at 674 (“Among the facts generally deemed 
relevant are (1) the length of time involved in the stop; (2) its public or 
private setting; (3) the number of participating law enforcement officers; 
(4) the risk of danger presented by the person stopped; and (5) the display or 
use of physical force against the person stopped, including firearms, 
handcuffs, and leg irons.”); United States v. Brown, 990 F.2d 397, 399 (8th 
Cir. 1993) (“(1) [W]hether the suspect was informed at the time of 
questioning that the questioning was voluntary, that the suspect was free to 
leave or request the officers to do so, or that the suspect was not considered 
under arrest; (2) whether the suspect possessed unrestrained freedom of 
movement during questioning; (3) whether the suspect initiated contact with 
authorities or voluntarily acquiesced to official request to respond to 
questions; (4) whether strong arm tactics or deceptive stratagems were 
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multiple-factor analyses do little to assist the police officer 
engaging in a spontaneous and fast on-the-street encounter. 
Common sense suggests that police officers asked to rely on 
such a multiple-factor analysis would in fact be relying on 
intuition—where the cost of an officer’s wrong intuition is 
exclusion,186 a firmer standard, designed for the needs of police 
officers conducting rapidly developing investigative stops, is 
imperative. 
C. The Application of Quarles’ Public Safety Exception to 
Terry Stops 
Quarles’ public safety exception permits statements made to 
police, before the reading of Miranda warnings, to be included 
as evidence in an ensuing criminal trial so long as the 
questioning by the police was reasonably prompted by an 
immediate concern for the safety of the police or public.187 Given 
this exception, Miranda warnings are only required during a 
Terry stop when police interrogation is targeted at gathering 
evidence, and not required before questions directed at resolving 
an immediate threat to public and officer safety. The public 
safety exception mitigates burdens on law enforcement, bolsters 
the policies that justify Terry stops, and balances the detainee’s 
civil right to Miranda warnings against public and officer safety. 
In Quarles, a woman told two police officers in Queens, 
New York, that she was just raped; she described the man and 
told the officers he had just entered a nearby supermarket and 
was armed.188 An officer reached the suspect in the store, frisked 
him, and discovered an empty shoulder holster.189 After 
                                                          
employed during questioning; (5) whether the atmosphere of the questioning 
was police dominated; or, (6) whether the suspect was placed under arrest at 
the termination of the questioning.”). See also supra Part II(A)(i). 
186 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (disallowing the admission 
of evidence seized pursuant to an unlawful search during the trial of the 
subject of the unlawful search). 
187 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). 
188 Id. at 651–52. 
189 Id. 
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handcuffing him, the officer asked where the gun was—the 
suspect “nodded in the direction of some empty cartons and 
responded, ‘the gun is over there.’”190 The officer then placed 
the suspect under arrest and read him his Miranda rights.191 
Quarles sought to have his statement, “the gun is over 
there,” excluded from trial because the officer had not yet given 
him his Miranda warnings.192 The Court noted that this case 
presented a situation where “concern for public safety must be 
paramount to adherence to the literal language of the 
prophylactic rules enunciated in Miranda,”193 and thus 
established a “public safety” exception to Miranda.194 The Court 
was largely persuaded by the realities of the encounter:195 first, 
in apprehending the suspect, the officers were confronted with 
the immediate necessity of discovering the location of a hidden 
gun in a public place. The situation posed dangers to the public 
because an accomplice might use it, or a customer or employee 
may find it.196 Second, the Court noted that if the police are 
“required to recite the familiar Miranda warnings before asking 
the whereabouts of the gun, suspects in Quarles’ position might 
well be deterred from responding.”197 The police officer “needed 
an answer to his question not simply to make his case against 
Quarles but to insure that further danger to the public did not 
result from the concealment of the gun in a public area.”198 
                                                          
190 Id. 
191 Id.  
192 See id. 
193 Id. at 653. 
194 Id. at 655. The Court also clarified that the availability of this 
exception does not depend upon the individual motivations of the police. Id. 
at 656. “In a kaleidoscopic situation such as the one confronting these 
officers, where spontaneity rather than adherence to a police manual is 
necessarily the order of the day, the application of the exception which we 
recognize today should not be made to depend on post hoc findings at a 
suppression hearing concerning the subjective motivation of the arresting 
officer.” Id. 
195 See id. at 657. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Third, the Court recognized the importance of an easily 
workable rule “to guide police officers, who have only limited 
time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and 
individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they 
confront.”199 Finally, while admitting that the present exception 
muddied Miranda’s bright-line rule, the Court concluded that 
this exception would not be difficult for police officers to apply 
because in each case police should be able to distinguish 
between questions necessary to secure personal or public safety 
and questions designed to elicit testimonial evidence.200  
Thus, if Terry stops may rise to Miranda custody, then 
Quarles’ public safety exception permits police to interrogate 
Terry detainees regarding immediate threats to public or officer 
safety without first delivering Miranda warnings. Since Terry 
stops are limited to resolving officers’ reasonable suspicions that 
a suspect is dangerous or about to commit a crime, it is likely 
that Miranda warnings will be excepted under Quarles during 
most Terry stops. Indeed, the Newton court took such an 
approach, ruling that although the defendant was in custody 
during his interrogation, the questioning, which was directed to 
the recovery of a gun, fell within the Quarles public safety 
exception to Miranda and survived suppression.201  
V. POSSIBLE CRITICISMS OF THE INDEPENDENT APPROACH 
A. The Costs of Issuing Miranda Warnings During a Terry 
Stop Outweigh the Benefits of the Prophylactic Rule 
Delivering Miranda warnings outside police station custodial 
interrogations can impose a significant cost and undermine 
effective law enforcement:202  
                                                          
199 Id. at 658 (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979)). 
200 Id. at 658–59. 
201 United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 677 (2d. Cir. 2004) 
(“[A]lthough Newton was in custody at the time of the challenged 
interrogation, questioning preliminary to the officers’ recovery of the charged 
firearm fell within the public safety exception to Miranda.”). 
202 Note, Custodial Engineering: Cleaning Up The Scope of Miranda 
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[t]he mere recital of a Miranda warning formalizes a 
police-civilian interaction, which “may discourage 
citizens from cooperating with the police” . . . the recital 
of the warning and the detainee’s likely responses also 
delay an on-the-scene investigation, which may endanger 
the police and public . . . vague Miranda requirements 
jeopardize on-the-scene inquiries by causing uncertainty 
for the police officers who must administer the warning, 
the subject who receives it, and the courts that must 
review it . . . empirical evidence demonstrates that the 
Terry stop, frisk, and inquiry “should not be 
underestimated” as a deterrent to crime . . . it would 
threaten the unstructured and spontaneous nature of the 
Terry stop by formalizing the inquiry . . . it would block 
the proper execution of Terry by increasing the potential 
for unconstitutional delay during the brief stop . . . [all 
are] additional burdens on a Terry stop [that] would 
diminish its utility to law enforcement, and that result 
contradicts the recent efforts by courts to ensure that 
Terry stop, frisk, and inquiry remains a viable 
investigative option.203 
The Warren Court recognized the burdens that law 
enforcement officials must bear,204 but remained adamant that the 
privilege against self-incrimination demanded certain 
sacrifices.205 Thus, as Terry stops increasingly resemble the type 
of intrusive conduct the Miranda Court deemed serious enough 
to warrant a prophylactic rule, society must accept the sacrifices 
Miranda requires in the context of a Terry stop. Moreover, 
Quarles’ public safety exception mitigates these potential costs to 
safety by excepting questions directed towards resolving an 
immediate danger to public or officer safety. And while issuing 
                                                          
Custody During Coercive Terry Stops, 108 HARV. L. REV. 665 (1995).  
203 Id. (emphasis added). 
204 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 481 (1966). 
205 Id. at 479. “The quality of a nation’s civilization can be largely 
measured by the methods it uses in the enforcement of its criminal law.” Id. 
at 480, n.50 (citing Walter V. Shaefer, Federalism and State Criminal 
Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 26 (1956)).  
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Miranda warnings to a suspect may result in a failure to obtain 
evidence that would otherwise be collected, this cost to society 
is tempered by the prevention of the coercive means by which 
that evidence would have been obtained.  
B. Police Will Be Unable to Determine Whether They Have 
Placed a Suspect in Miranda Custody 
Before the permissible scope of a Terry stop expanded, the 
concepts of “arrest” and “custody” were closely related and 
Terry stops looked nothing like the behavior that constituted 
Miranda custody.206 Simply, officers knew Miranda warnings 
were not required during a lawful Terry stop. However, if 
Miranda applies to Terry stops, police officers must determine 
more than whether they have the requisite reasonable suspicion 
to conduct an investigative stop. In addition, they must consider 
whether the level of coerciveness with which they are 
conducting the search constitutes a custodial or non-custodial 
investigative stop for Miranda purposes, as well as whether their 
questions are directed at gathering evidence or resolving an 
immediate public safety suspicion.  
While these additional requirements complicate the 
orchestration of a Terry stop, they are necessary to balance the 
privilege against self-incrimination against the safety of the 
public and police officers. The difficulty of determining Miranda 
custody could be answered more easily with firmer guidelines 
from courts.207 Further, inquiry into the purpose of an officer’s 
questioning will not significantly impose on law enforcement 
efforts. As the Court explained in Quarles, “[w]e think police 
officers can and will distinguish almost instinctively between 
questions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of 
the public and questions designed solely to elicit testimonial 
evidence from a suspect.”208  
                                                          
206 Williamson, supra note 175. 
207 See supra Part IV(B). 
208 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658–59 (1984). 
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C. Terry Should Be Returned to Its Original Contours 
One commentator proposes resolving the Circuit split 
regarding the application of Miranda to Terry by returning “the 
Terry doctrine to its pre-expansion dimensions, and thereby 
diffus[ing] the tension that has recently been created between 
Terry and Miranda.”209 In short, the commentator argues that the 
best option to resolve the question of Miranda applicability to 
Terry is to reverse the expansion of Terry for two reasons: 
“(1) it is contrary to relevant Supreme Court authority, and 
(2) it has not been supported by persuasive or logical 
rationales.”210 Further “any frustration of police investigatory 
tactics caused by reversing Terry’s uncalled-for expansion would 
be counteracted by the efficiency and bright-line nature of the 
resulting rule.”211 
This argument does not attack the soundness of the circuits’ 
differing views, but rather identifies a misstep by courts in 
permitting an environment to develop that is capable of fostering 
the present disagreement.212 Although the simplicity of this 
approach is attractive, it ignores the reason that Terry expanded: 
an evolution of the type and rate of crime in this country since 
the Warren Court’s decisions.213 Regardless of the virtues of 
Terry’s expansion, courts must take steps to protect suspects 
Fifth Amendment rights.214 
                                                          
209 Godsey, supra note 181, at 741 (emphasis added).  
210 Id. 
211 Id. at 747. 
212 A response that fully addresses this argument is most appropriate for 
another case comment or article. 
213 United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838, 844 (5th Cir. 1994). 
214 United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1465 (10th Cir. 1993) (“Police 
officers must make a choice–if they are going to take highly intrusive steps to 
protect themselves from danger, they must similarly provide protection to 
their suspects by advising them of their constitutional rights.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
In August of 2008, the Attorney General of New Mexico 
filed a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court 
requesting review of the New Mexico Court of Appeals’ 
decision in State v. Snell,215 which adopted the independent 
approach and required Miranda warnings be read to a suspect 
detained in a squad car at a Terry traffic stop.216 The Court of 
Appeals stated that if a “motorist who has been detained 
pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that 
renders him ‘in custody’ for practical purposes, he will be 
entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by 
Miranda.”217 Challenging this decision, the Attorney General 
cited to the First and Fourth Circuit’s approach in Trueber and 
Leshuk to support its position that New Mexico’s high court 
misapplied Berkemer and Miranda.218 The State’s petition 
acknowledged that  
[c]ourts and commentators alike have struggled with the 
manner in which the concept of arrest intersects the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments . . . . The question 
seemingly left open by Berkemer, and on which both 
federal and state courts disagree, is whether Miranda 
extends to investigative detentions in which police 
officers use a greater than normal level of force in 
response to safety or other law enforcement concerns 
without effecting a de facto arrest.219  
The petition was denied on December 1, 2008,220 and thus the 
question will continue to be reserved for states and lower courts. 
                                                          
215 New Mexico v. Snell, 166 P.2d 1106 (2007). 
216 Id. at 1111–12. 
217 Snell, 166 P.3d at 1111.  
218 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24, State v. Snell, 129 S. Ct. 626 
(2008) (No. 08-196), available at 2008 WL 3833284. 
219 Id. at 7. The petition also noted that the Second Circuit recognized a 
circuit split and broke from the First and Fourth Circuit in their approach to 
the application of Miranda to Terry stops. Id. 
220 State v. Snell, 129 S. Ct. 626 (2008). 
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As the constitutional guidelines governing criminal 
procedures evolve, it is imperative that the new rules reflect the 
actual changes and practices of law enforcement. Mindful of the 
changes in nature of a Terry stop, courts ought to apply Miranda 
to the context of a lawful Terry stop that rises to the level of 
custody imagined by Miranda. 
